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The overutilization of forest resources, which is currently taking place in most tropical
countries, is the result of two main factors driving a wedge between private and social costs
of forest use: market failure and policy failure (Barbier et al., 1992). Market failure is due to
the fact that tropical forests do not only supply timber and land for agricultural conversion but
also provide ecological benefits, which because of their public good properties or lacking
property rights do not enter into the user's decision making process. Some of these ecological
benefits, such as the protection of soils against erosion and nutrient losses, affect only the
tropical countries themselves, while others, notably the fixing of carbon and the provision of
habitat for a large share of the world's biological diversity, accrue to the whole world. Hence,
local as well as global externalities have to be considered. Moreover, ecologically harmful
government activities frequently exacerbate the pressure on tropical forests (Repetto, Gillis,
1988). These policy failures range from subsidized settlement schemes to the protection of
domestic wood processing industries. Macroeconomic policies, such as trade or exchange rate
policies, may as well have a significant indirect impact on deforestation (Capistrano, Kiker,
1990; Thiele, Wiebelt, 1993b).
Since different factors contribute to the suboptimal forest utilization and since different
economic sectors, particularly agriculture and forestry, use forest resources, a policy package
may be required, which combines the removal of domestic distortions with national resource
policy measures and international measures. This paper quantitatively investigates such policy
measures for the case of Indonesia by calculating their effects on aggregate output, economic
structure as well as on the utilization of forest resources. For this purpose, a computable
general equilibrium (CGE) model was developed, which - contrary to a partial equilibrium
approach - captures the economy-wide repercussions of sectoral policies and hence allows for
conclusions about structural responses and the change in land use patterns. The ultimate
objective of the analysis is to sort out policy packages, which simultaneously protect tropical
forests and stimulate an efficient resource allocation.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the major policy options which are
available for the Indonesian government. Section 3 explains the main features of the CGE
model, putting particular emphasis on the treatment of the forestry sector. This section also
includes a short description of the numerical specification of the model. Section 4 presents the
results of the policy simulations for Indonesia. The paper closes with some concluding
remarks.2. Policy Options
1
Any policy package for a better management of Indonesia's tropical forests has to aim at two
different users, namely the timber industry and agriculture,
2 and should contain measures to
correct for market failure at the local and global level as well as policies to correct for policy
failure. Moreover, one can argue that even such distortions which might be regarded as
environmentally friendly - e.g., the taxation of agricultural exports - should be removed in
order to achieve efficiency gains and to approximate a first-best starting point for the
application of environmental policy instruments.
The creation of adequate property rights is the first step towards internalizing the local
externalities of deforestation. In the timber industry, the contractual arrangements for
concessionaires have to be improved. One possibility is to base the duration of logging
concessions for the state-owned Indonesian forests on the regeneration period of about 35
years, whereas the licences are currently given for 20 years only (Gillis, 1988). Other
arrangements, such as conditioning the continuation of short-term contracts on "sustainable"
harvesting practices or even the outright sale of the land, could also be applied (Barbier et al.,
1992). In any case, the licences should be tradable to provide an incentive for the
concessionaires to maintain the value of their timber stands (Repetto, 1988). For the
agricultural sector, the establishment of a land market on the Outer Islands is of utmost
importance. This would make large areas of underutilized or degraded land on the Outer
Islands, which is currently claimed by the local population, available for settlers and thereby
would reduce the necessity to clear additional forested areas (World Bank, 1990).
With secure property rights, the remaining external costs can be internalized by means of
price or quantity measures. A first-best example of the former is a tax on the use of tropical
forest land, because it is levied - as suggested by the theory of domestic distortions (Corden,
1974) - exactly at the point where the externality occurs. Since logging is ecologically less
harmful than agricultural conversion and since the cultivation of tree crops like coffee and
rubber causes less damage than the cultivation of food crops like rice and cassava (Repetto,
1989), there is a rationale for differentiated tax rates. An alternative way of narrowing the gap
between the private and social costs of deforestation is to fix upper limits for the use of forest
resources. The government could either reduce the allowable cut under the Indonesian
1 This section only provides a short overview of the policy options for a more sustainable management of
Indonesia's tropical forests. For a more detailed discussion, see Thiele (1994).
2 Agricultural conversion of forest land on the Outer Islands of Indonesia is partly due to government-
sponsored settlement and partly due to shifting cultivation (FAO, 1991). Other economic activities, such as
the exploitation of minerals and the construction of hydroelectric power plants are not significantly
contributing to deforestation in Indonesia.selective logging system
3 or directly set aside areas, e.g., by establishing national parks.
National parks should be located on areas with rich biodiversity and low quality soils which
are not suitable for agricultural use. As a prerequisite for the achievement of such an
allocation, the government has to carry out a detailed land use planning (Thiele, 1994).
If all local external costs of deforestation are accounted for, the timber concessionaire is still
making an economic rent. The government can capture all or part of the rent through fees and
taxes (Gray, Hadi, 1990). Low rent capture causes a problem because high excess profits
encourage "rent seeking" in acquiring concessions and open the way for corruption.
Moreover, low forest fees underprice timber and thus allow inefficient and wasteful logging
and processing. The underpricing of timber is further aggravated by an aggressive promotion
of domestic wood processing (Barbier et al., 1992). In 1985, Indonesia introduced a log
export ban, which was followed by nearly prohibitive export taxes on rough and semi-
processed sawnwood in 1989. As it is likely that these trade restrictions have resulted in both
economic losses and a waste of forest resources they should be relaxed.
The most powerful incentives for agricultural conversion of forest areas result from the
Indonesian Transmigration Program where the government carries all cost of resettling people
from the Inner to the Outer Islands. Agricultural production on transmigration sites has
traditionally been dominated by low-input cultivation of food crops, especially rice, but
recently the planting of tree crops has also been sponsored (World Bank, 1990). Taking the
very limited economic potential of food crop production on converted forest land on the one
hand and the high direct cost of transmigration as well as the ecological cost of deforestation
on the other hand, the Indonesian government should not continue to sponsor food crop
production on transmigration sites. If the government regards some transmigration as
necessary to ease population pressure in the Inner Islands, it should concentrate on tree crop
development, because tree crop schemes promise higher income for transmigrants and lower
ecological costs in terms of soil erosion and loss of biodiversity. Moreover, there is a high
potential to increase yields per hectare which would make it possible to reduce the conversion
of forests without foregoing tree crop production (World Bank, 1990).
General agricultural policies, which may have a significant indirect impact on deforestation,
contain two dominant components (Gonzales et al., 1993). First, the government stabilizes the
output price of the main staple rice. In general, the government has been successful in
keeping domestic prices in line with world market prices while counteracting short-run
fluctuations in the world price. Second, essential agricultural inputs like irrigation, fertilizer
and pesticides are heavily subsidized. Agricultural trade restrictions do prevail but import
tariffs and export taxes, which are imposed on some cash crops, are fairly low. Trade in
The objective of the selective logging system is to account for the renewability of the Indonesian tropical
forest in order to achieve a sustained yield of wood products. It has so far shown a poor record, primarily
because of high logging damage and relogging before the end of the harvesting cycle (Gillis, 1992).general has been liberalized stepwise since 1983, starting from a situation with high import
tariffs and numerous quantitative restrictions such as quotas and import licenses which is
characteristic of an import-substitution strategy (Balassa, 1991). Altogether, there is still
room for Indonesia to move towards a more neutral incentive structure.
For the internalization of the global external costs of deforestation, i.e., climate change and
the loss of biodiversity, two broad categories of instruments are available: import restrictions
for tropical hardwood and international compensation payments for the conservation of
tropical forests (see, for instance, Barbier et al., 1992).
Import restrictions for tropical hardwood have the advantage that they can be applied directly
without any prior bargaining. However, their ecological effectiveness is not guaranteed. A
necessary condition for import restrictions to be effective is that the tropical country - as
Indonesia does - exports a substantial share of the forestry output. This has to be weighed
against the fact that in Indonesia not only the timber industry but also agriculture is a major
user of tropical forest resources. It may well turn out that as a result of lower profitability in
the timber industry the conversion of land for agricultural use will increase to such an extent
that the damage for the tropical forest will be higher than without any policy intervention.
Import restrictions have at least three additional disadvantages. First, they have adverse
distributional consequences by shifting nearly all the adjustment costs to the tropical
countries. Second, they make any complementary protective measures in the tropical
countries unlikely. Finally, import restrictions are inferior to national resource policies from a
welfare theoretic point of view, because they imply additional deadweight losses by distorting
consumption (Braga, 1992).
Compensation payments build on the cooperation between industrial and tropical countries,
because they rely on complementary national environmental policy measures. Contrary to
development aid, they should not be interpreted as a grant but as a payment for an
environmental service (Amelung, Diehl, 1992). The theoretical reference point for the
amount of money spent is the gap between the economic losses for the developing country
caused by the implementation of a resource policy and the ecological benefits accruing to the
developing country through the conservation of its forests (Amelung, 1991). The actual
payments will, however, crucially depend upon the bargaining power of the parties involved
in the treaty. Since most of the global public benefits are derived by the developed countries,
they are in a weak bargaining position with respect to the shrinking rain forests (Sandier,
1993). Furthermore, it has to be decided how the transfer should be used. In order to be
effective in compensating the net losers of forest conservation, the transfer must contain some
kind of conditionality, e.g., the prescription that the funds have to be invested in the creation
of new employment opportunities outside the tropical forest.The aforementioned measures to reduce market and policy failure will be empirically
analyzed with respect to their consequences for the economy and the use of tropical forest
resources. But first, the main characteristics of the model have to be described.
3. The Model
The model applied in the simulation analysis is a standard trade-oriented CGE model as
described in Dervis et al. (1982), extended by a submodel for the forestry sector (Dee,
1991).
4 A major advantage of the multisectoral approach is that it captures the impacts of
different policy measures on land use patterns. This is important, because the question of
whether forests should be logged, or left as protected areas, or cleared entirely for agricultural
use, is primarily a question of land use allocation. The forestry submodel enables us to
examine the conventional forestry policy measures like resource taxes, secure property rights,
selective logging regimes, and the setting up of national parks.
3.1 The Forestry Submodel
The treatment of the forestry sector is closely related to the forest economics literature. The
traditional economic problem is to find the rotation period^ that maximizes the present value
of net returns from the current and all future harvests, at given timber prices, harvesting costs,
interest rates, and physical growth characteristics of trees (Bowes, Krutilla, 1985). While the
traditional model does not take into account the environmental services provided by the
forest, we do so by constraining harvests via the introduction of a minimum harvest age T*
(Nguyen, 1979), By means of such a selective logging regime the government can ensure that
a certain minimum timber stock remains after each harvest. In the modified model, foresters
choose the optimal harvest age T so as to maximize
where PV is the present value of net returns per hectare, RR is the net return per hectare per
rotation, T-T* is the rotation period, and r is the discount rate applied by the concessionaire.
6
The first-order condition of the maximization problem is given by
4 Thiele, Wiebelt (1993a) present a detailed formal description of the model.
5 The rotation period is the length of time between two harvests on a specific area (here on one ha).
6 Note that 1 / (l - e~
r(1 "
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)) +..., i.e., we assume
an infinite planning horizon.with RR = (px • HV - RC) • (l - tP) (2a)
= Px dHVIcTT (\-tF), (2b)
where HV denotes the volume of timber harvested per hectare per rotation, Px the output
price of timber, RC the harvest costs per hectare per rotation, and tF a factor tax on forest
land.
The interpretation of the first-order condition is that foresters should harvest at the age T or,
equivalently, choose the rotation period T-T*, at which the marginal increase in net revenues
from further growth of the forest (RR') just equals the opportunity cost of delaying the
harvest. The opportunity cost is the potential interest income foregone on the delayed receipt
of harvesting revenues. The correction term l/[l-e~
r^
r~
T*^) accounts for the fact that.if the
rotation period is extended, not only the current harvest but also future harvests are
postponed.
The comparative static properties of the forestry model are as follows. First, equation (2)
reveals that an increase in the discount rate, which may be attributed to more insecure
property rights for concessionaires, raises the opportunity costs of letting trees grow and
hence leads to a shorter rotation period. Second, a rise in the timber output price raises both
the marginal revenues from further growth and the opportunity costs. Using the definitions
(2a) and (2b), it becomes obvious that , with positive harvesting costs, the increase in RR is
stronger than that in RR' so that the rotation period shortens. Finally, higher harvesting costs
reduce opportunity costs, leading to an extension of the rotation period.
The physical growth of trees is described by a logistic functional form (Figure I).
7 Initially,
trees grow very rapidly. Slower growth sets in as the stand matures, until growth stops when
the climax state (MV) is reached. At any chosen rotation period, the physical growth
characteristics of trees determine the volume of timber that can be harvested per hectare per
rotation. This can be discerned from Figure 1. Assume that the initial rotation period was
To -T*. This corresponds to a harvest size of TVO -SV, where TV denotes the volume of
timber per hectare before the harvest, and SV the minimum volume of timber that has to be
left as a result of the minimum harvest age 7*. Now assume that the forestry sector is forced
to shorten the rotation period to 7j -T*. As a consequence, the harvested volume per
rotation is reduced to 7Vj -SV.
Logging technology is described by a Leontief function which combines land and a non-land
input bundle consisting of capital, labor and intermediate inputs at the top of a multi-level
' The assumption of a logistic growth curve is common in the literature on renewable resources (e.g. Wilen,
1985; Clark, 1990).Figure 1 - Logistic Growth Curve of Trees
Time
production function. It is assumed that the bundle of non-land inputs is fixed per rotation,
which gives rise to a form of increasing returns to scale (Dee, 1991). Within the input bundle,
substitution possibilities between labor and capital and between imported and domestically
produced intermediates are allowed.
Since the harvest volume HV above is defined per hectare per rotation, it has to be translated
into annual output for the entire forest in order to make the forestry submodel compatible
with the rest of the model. Assuming that the harvest per rotation is equally distributed over
the years of the rotation period, annual timber output X from the whole harvested area B is
= HVB/{T-T*). (3)
3.2 The Rest of the Model
The rest of the model follows conventional lines. Domestic supply of all sectors except
forestry is given by a constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production function, using labor, land
(in agriculture), and sector-specific capital, which is fixed in the short run. A Leontief
function combines the aggregate of primary factors and intermediate inputs. The producers ineach sector choose their demand for labor (and land in agriculture) and their output so as to
maximize profits at the given wage rates, factor taxes, land prices, commodity prices and
capital stocks.
Regarding foreign trade, Indonesia is assumed to be a small country not able to influence
world market prices. While this is in accordance with classical trade theory, we deviate from
its assumptions in some other respects. First, domestically produced goods and imports of the
same product category are regarded as imperfect substitutes. The substitution possibilities for
domestic consumers are described by a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) function
(Armington, 1969). In a similar way, differences in quality between domestically consumed
and exported commodities are described by a CET (Constant Elasticity of Transformation)
function (Powell, Gruen, 1968). Finally, Indonesia's exports are specified as facing a constant
elasticity demand function. This formulation takes account of the fact that as domestic
production costs of a commodity rise (fall) relative to those abroad, the country may loose
(gain) foreign market shares.
In the household sector, it is assumed that there is only one representative consumer who buys
consumer goods according to fixed expenditure shares. This demand system is derived from
the maximization of a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Government demand for final goods is
defined using fixed shares of aggregate real spending on goods and services. The sectoral
allocation of investable funds is determined by exogenously given share parameters.
Inventories are a fixed proportion of sectoral supply.
In order to solve the CGE model, market clearing equations for the product and factor
markets as well as macroeconomic equilibrium conditions for the balance of payments and
the savings-investment balance have to be specified. Supply and demand in product markets
is equilibrated by the adjustment of sectoral prices. For the factor markets we assume that the
supply of each factor is exogenously fixed.
8 Market clearing requires that total factor demand
equals supply, and the equilibrating variables are the average factor prices. While sectoral
capital stocks are assumed to be fix, labor is intersectorally mobile. In agriculture, production
in the Inner and Outer Islands is distinguished (see Section 3.3) Land is mobile across all
agricultural activities and forestry, but not between the two regions. With foreign savings set
exogenously, equilibrium in the balance of payments is achieved via adjustments in the real
exchange rate. Changes in the real exchange rate are the result of movements in the nominal
exchange rate, while the absolute price level serves as the numeraire of the model. Finally,
8 With respect to land, the assumption of an exogenously fixed aggregate supply seems to be justified for
Indonesia. In the Inner Islands, especially in Java, there are virtually no land reserves for agricultural
production. In the Outer Islands, the access of the forestry sector is restricted by the provision of
concessions, while transmigrants and shifting cultivators are usually not able to open up new primary
forests without the provision of infrastructure by the government or the timber concessionaires.aggregate investment is the endogenous sum of private, government and foreign savings, i.e.,
the model is "savings-driven".
Despite the intertemporal treatment of forestry the model can be solved within a comparative
static framework. For the analysis of compensation payments, however, a dynamic
formulation is required, which allows to investigate the growth effects of different allocations
of international transfer payments. To take an extreme example: if the money is exclusively
spent for consumption purposes, this will mainly cause Dutch Disease effects, if it is invested
this will enhance the production capacity and thus lay the ground for the creation of new
employment opportunities. The dynamic specification contains equations governing the
growth of primary factors over time.
9 While the total supply of labor and land is adjusted
exogenously, sectoral capital stocks are built up according to a simple investment model. In
this investment model, the sectoral allocation of investable funds is adjusted as a function of
the relative profit rate of each sector compared to the average profit rate in the economy.
Sectors with higher-than-average profit rates will then get a larger share of investable funds
than their share in aggregate profits.
3.3 Numerical Specification of the Model
The theoretical model was calibrated to a consistent data set for the year 1985, which is
assumed to represent a benchmark equilibrium of the Indonesian economy. The main source
of data is the 1985 Indonesian input-output table (BPS, 1989), supplemented by FAO/UNEP
(1981) and Amelung, Diehl (1992) which provide information to calibrate the forestry
submodel, as well as BPS (1983) which provides the basis for splitting gross operating
surplus into returns to capital and land.
The model distinguishes 13 sectors of production (see Table 1), of which 7 are directly - rice,
other food crops, cash crops and forestry - or indirectly via strong linkages to agriculture and
forestry - fertilizer and pesticides, wood processing and consumer goods - involved in the
exploitation of forest resources. In order to be able to analyze the effects of transmigration
policies, three agricultural sectors - rice, other food crops and cash crops - are further
disaggregated into Inner Island and Outer Island production. This disaggregation is achieved
by calculating regional output figures and assuming identical input and demand structures in
both regions. Only with respect to fertilizer and pesticides we take into account the empirical
observation that their use in the Outer Islands is lower than in the Inner Islands.
Table 1 summarizes some important structural features of the Indonesian economy. The
structure of production reveals a typical composition of output in developing countries where
primary sectors and services together contribute more than 60 percent to GDP. Cash crops,
9 It is assumed that agents are myopic, basing their decisions on static expectations about prices and
quantities. As a consequence, the dynamic model can be solved recursively for a sequence of equilibria.10
mining, wood processing and export-oriented industries (mainly petroleum refining) are the
only sectors with considerable export orientation. Oil and natural gas alone account for about
65 percent of total exports. The share of imports in domestic absorption is generally quite
low, apart from some capital goods included in the import-substituting industries.
Construction is the only pure non-traded sector, but there are some other sectors where both
export and import shares are very low. The last three columns of Table 1 show the trade
elasticities used in the model. The import substitution and export transformation elasticities
are taken from Devarajan, Lewis (1991). With a few exceptions, they indicate a fairly high
extent of product differentiation due to differences in quality and the degree of product
heterogeneity. The export demand elasticities, which reflect the ease with which foreign users
can substitute domestic products, are taken from Rutstrom (1991). They are of medium size
and uniform across sectors.




















































































































Source: BPS (1989); Devarajan, Lewis (1991); Rutstrom (1991).
Once having constructed a consistent data set, one can compute the equilibrium prices (or the
actually traded quantities, if prices are exogenously given), which in turn determine the
allocation of resources and the use of tropical forests. The effects of different policy measures
are analyzed by running model simulations. This means that exogenous variables are changed
and a new equilibrium is computed. Policy appraisal then proceeds on the basis of pairwise
comparison of counterfactual and benchmark equilibria. With capital fixed and labor and land
mobile across sectors, the solutions generated by the model should be interpreted as short to
medium term results. To capture long-run effects, the model needs to be extended. Forexample, one has to keep track of the negative stock effects deforestation has on agricultural
productivity (Ehui, Hertel, 1989).
4. Simulation Results
The following simulations show how forestry policies, the removal of domestic distortions, a
change in transmigration policy and international measures affect the economy and the use of
forest resources.
4.1 Forestry Policies
It is assumed in this section that the target of the Indonesian government is to achieve a
specified increase in the volume of standing timber. For concreteness the target for each
policy measure is set at 500 million m
3, equivalent to about 20 percent of the actual biomass
losses caused by deforestation and forest degradation. Altogether, four different policy
instruments are distinguished.
The first is an increase in the length of forest leases so that concessionaires have an incentive
to take account of the user costs of short-run harvesting and hence to harvest the stand at the
private long-run efficient level. This has been modeled as a reduction of the discount rate,
which concessionaires apply to calculate their returns from forestry, from 9.5 percent to 6.3
percent. The objective of the remaining three instruments is to deal with the environmental
externalities of deforestation and forest degradation. The first option we consider is an
increase in the stipulated minimum harvest age of trees by 19 years in order to make forestry
more sustainably. The second option is a direct set-aside in the form of a national park. The
increase in national parks has been modeled as a reduction'in the total area of land on the
Outer Islands being available for forestry and agriculture by 3.6 million ha. The final option
is a tax on income from forest land.
1
0 As the ecological damage varies according to land use
patterns, the tax rates are differentiated, i.e., 10 percent for forestry, 15 percent for cash crops
and 25 percent for rice and other food crops.
1
1
Table 2 shows the impact of each forestry policy on real GDP, aggregate exports, and the real
exchange rate as well as on sectoral production and producer prices. It is striking that all
policies induce a considerable reduction of forestry's production which in turn leads to
1
0 A tax on income from forest land is also a means of capturing a sizeable proportion of the resource rent
. accruing to foresters (Gray, 1983). Because of the similarity of the results, separate simulations for rent
capture will not be reported here.
1
1 In the agricultural sectors, the taxation is only valid for production on the Outer Islands.12
increasing domestic producer prices.
1
2 The change in the annual forestry activity level is
determined by three variables (see Equation 3):
— the rotation period;
— the volume of timber harvested per hectare per rotation; and
— the area of land devoted to forestry.
The forestry sector adjusts these variables in different ways depending on the specific policy
measure.
When the discount rate is lowered (Simulation 1), this reduces the opportunity cost of letting
trees grow so that there is an incentive for concessionaires to extend the rotation period. Since
the subsequent increase in the harvested volume per rotation does not fully compensate for
the more infrequent harvests, the net result is a reduction in annual output and a rise in the
timber price. As gross harvest revenues increase, because the rise in the timber price is
stronger than the decline in output, and annual harvesting costs decrease, because the rotation
period is extended, forestry net revenues and the stock value of land increase. This creates the
price signal to attract additional land into forestry and thereby eases off the initial output
reduction.
1
3 This reallocation of land significantly contributes to the achievement of the
ecological target, because it implies that the planned conversion of some forest areas does not
take place. As a consequence of the lower availability of land for agriculture, agricultural
output on the Outer Islands declines and producer prices increase.
The primary impact of an increase in the minimum harvest age (Simulation 2) is that foresters
have to wait for trees to grow larger before they harvest them, i.e., the rotation period is
shortened exogenously. This change in the logging regime reduces the opportunity costs of
forest growth by making earlier future harvests possible. As a consequence, concessionaires
increase the age at which they actually harvest the trees. On balance, the rotation period is
extended. The change in the volume of timber harvested per rotation is the result of two
offsetting factors. First, at any given minimum harvest age, the increase in the actual harvest
age leads to a higher harvested volume (see Figure 1). Second, the increase in the minimum
harvest age reduces the harvestable timber volume by stipulating a higher amount of timber
(SV) that has to be left after each harvest. In Indonesia, the second effect dominates the first
and hence the harvest per hectare per rotation falls. Both the lower and less frequent harvests
translate into a decline in annual output and a drastic rise in timber prices. Via the same
mechanism as described for Simulation 1, the negative output effect is partly offset by an
1
2 The fact that the contraction in domestic supply forces up domestic limber prices, although log imports are
available, is a result of the Armington assumption of imperfect substitution between domestic and imported
commodities.
1
3 The 4.6 percent decline in annual output is the net result of a 15.1 percent increase in the length of the
rotation period and two offsetting factors, namely a 5.4 percent increase in the harvest volume per rotation
and a 5.1 percent increase in the land devoted to forestry: -15.1 +5.4 +5.1 = -4.6 (see Table 2).Bibliofhek 13
increase in the area of land devoted to forestry, while agricultural production on the Outer
Islands decreases due to lower land use.



























































































































'All policies are calibrated to produce an incrase in standing timber of about 500 million m
3 compared to the
reference situation. The figures for 'rice', other food crops' and cash crops' only refer to the Outer Istands. -
2An increase (decrease) in the real exchange rate indicates an appreciation (depreciation).
Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
The establishment of a national park (Simulation 3) initially reduces the area available for
forestry activities. As a consequence, annual output declines, pushing up the price of
domestically produced timber. The higher output price provides the incentive for
concessionaires to undertake more frequent harvests, because it raises the opportunity costs
by more than the marginal revenues of forest growth (see Section 3.1). The shorter rotation
period, in turn, leads to smaller harvests per rotation. On balance, annual production fallsand14
the output price increases. With gross revenues increasing more than annual harvesting costs,
a rising stock value of land attracts land from agriculture thereby cushioning the output
reduction in forestry and lowering agricultural output in the Outer Islands.
A general taxation of land in the Outer Islands (Simulation 4) forces up the price of land in
forestry as well as in agriculture and thus leads to reduced demand for this factor in both
sectors. As the frequency and the intensity of harvests adjust only marginally and compensate
each other, the decline in annual output of the forestry sector is solely due to the reduction of
land use.
All forestry policy measures have two dominant effects which go beyond the forestry sector.
First, as mentioned before, the reallocation of land from agriculture to forestry causes a
contraction of agricultural production in the Outer Islands. Second, the price increase of
timber-penalizes wood processing, which has strong backward linkages to forestry, by
increasing input costs. Because of forestry's weak linkages to other sectors there are only
minor real adjustments in the rest of the economy. The output losses in forestry, wood




Basically, the ecological target specified above can be realized by each of the four forestry
policies. Taking into account the fact that in Indonesia the rotation period is too short and at
the same time the harvesting intensity is very high, an increase in the minimum harvest age
may be regarded as the best solution from an ecological point of view, because it contributes
to the reduction of both problems by extending the rotation period and reducing the harvest
volume. If combined with more secure property rights, this measures would extend the
rotation period to the 35-year harvesting cycle stipulated by the government and harvests per
rotation would be still lower than in the base run.
4.2 Removal of Distortions
This subsection deals with the question of how a more neutral incentive structure in the
Indonesian economy might affect the utilization of tropical forests. Are there trade-offs
between efficiency and ecological objectives? To answer this question, we examine the
effects of removing three of the most significant economic distortions prevailing in Indonesia.
First, a liberalization of the timber industry is considered. For modeling this policy change,
the export ban on logs was transformed into a prohibitive export tax. This export tax was then
eliminated together with the import tariff and the export tax on processed wood. Second, we
1
4 In order to assess the welfare implications of the forestry policy measures, these reductions in real GDP
have to be balanced with the long-run ecological gains derived from the protection of the forests.15
simulate a removal of the fertilizer and pesticides subsidy, which is by far the dominating
distortion in agriculture.
1
5 Finally, an economy-wide abolition of import tariffs is examined.
Table 3 shows the impact of these policies on some important macroeconomic aggregates,
sectoral production and the use of forest resources. All three measures cause real GDP to
increase by only 0.2 percent. This does not come as a surprise, because the supply and
productivity of primary factors and hence the production possibility frontier of the economy
is exogenously fixed in this model so that increases in real GDP only measure static
efficiency gains. The low efficiency gains of a general trade liberalization can be explained
by the fact that import tariffs were already cut to a relatively moderate average level of 27
percent in the base year 1985 (Balassa, 1991), while quantitative restrictions, which were still
widespread in 1985, are not included in the analysis.
The impact of the three policy measures on deforestation and forest degradation depends on
how they affect the sectoral allocation of resources. A liberalization of the timber industry
(Simulation 5) directly affects relative prices in forestry and wood processing. The removal
of the export tax for forestry greatly improves its competitiveness in world markets and
pushes up export sales. With lower domestic supply the domestic timber price increases. In
wood processing, the elimination of import tariffs and export taxes, both of which were at a
rate of about 10 percent in 1985,
1
6 almost cancel out in their effect on production and
domestic prices, but the trade orientation of the sector increases.
Apart from these direct effects which determine the initial response in the deregulated
markets, the economy-wide effects must be taken into account in order to determine the final
resource shift in the economy. In the present case, the main cross-sectoral effect runs via the
strong forward linkage of forestry to wood processing. With increasing domestic timber
prices, intermediate input costs for the wood processing industry rise and the sector slightly
contracts. Other channels for economy-wide effects are less important. There is no marked
change of intermediate input costs in other sectors than wood processing, because forestry has
no strong forward linkages to the rest of the economy. Real wages remain almost constant.
Finally, only a minor real appreciation is required to restore equilibrium in the trade balance,
which has improved due to the removal of export taxes in forestry.
Altogether, the change in the use of forest resources can be traced back to the rising domestic
timber price. As shown in Section 3, this provides an incentive for concessionaires to shorten
the rotation period which is followed by a lower harvesting intensity. Shorter rotation periods
raise annual harvesting costs, but this is overcompensated by higher gross revenues so that
land is attracted to forestry. As a consequence, the volume of standing timber substantially
1
5 A liberalization of agricultural trade was also examined, but because of low trade taxes and low trade
elasticities there were only very small effects so that the results are not reported here.
1
6 The tightening of export restrictions for processed wood in 1989 is not examined here.16
increases compared to the reference situation. The only disadvantage of this ecologically
beneficial outcome is the shortening of the rotation period. To avoid more frequent harvests
and the additional logging damage this implies, a policy package containing the liberalization
of the timber industry, more secure property rights and a more restrictive selective logging
regime is a viable option.





















































































Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
A removal of the fertilizer and pesticides subsidy (Simulation 6) pushes up the domestic price
of fertilizer and pesticides by more than 25 percent. This hurts agriculture which faces higher
secondary input costs.
1
7 The effect is, however, mainly limited to agricultural production in
the Inner Islands, where the use of fertilizer and pesticides is significantly higher than in the
Outer Islands. Consequently, the profitability of agriculture in the Outer Islands is not
1
7 Other economy-wide effects do not play a significant role.17
changed very much. Nevertheless, there is a small reduction in the area converted to
agriculture and hence a small increase in the volume of standing timber. In forestry, only
minor adjustment needs occur. With harvesting costs and revenues being roughly constant,
foresters have no incentive to alter the rotation length and, hence, the harvested volume
remains at the initial level. The small output expansion is solely the result of the reallocation
of land.
If import tariffs are eliminated across-the-board (Simulation 7), domestic users substitute
imports for domestically produced goods in all tradable sectors. For the import-substituting
industries which has a high import share and a relatively high initial protection level,
increasing imports correspond to substantial decreases in domestic demand so that it is most
heavily affected by the direct effects of a trade liberalization. This picture is qualified, when
the economy-wide repercussions are taken into account. First, abolishing tariffs reduces
intermediate input cost throughout the economy. This stimulates production in those sectors
having strong backward linkages and a high share of imported in total intermediate use, i.e.
predominantly in manufacturing. Second, the real exchange rate has to depreciate by 8.5
percent, thereby inducing a reallocation of resources towards traded goods. The real
depreciation favors cash crops, mining and most manufacturing sectors, while it hurts
construction, the only non-tradable sector, as well as rice, other food crops and forestry,
which can almost be treated as additional non-tradable sectors. Finally, the removal of trade
restrictions lowers domestic real wages which again works in favor of sectors producing
export goods and import substitutes and hence being exposed to international price
competition.
On balance, cash crops, mining, wood processing and export-oriented industries are the
winners of trade liberalization, while the non-traded and nearly non-traded sectors as well as
import-substituting industries, where the direct effect dominates, are the losers. This final
resource shift corresponds to a decrease in the volume of standing timber, because cash crops
attract land from forestry and food crops so that agricultural conversion increases compared
to the reference situation. Hence, the trade liberalization does not overcome the trade-off
between efficiency and ecological objectives. The negative side effect of trade liberalization
on tropical forests is, however, so small that it can easily be offset by a specific forestry
policy measure.
4.3 Transmigration Policy
When analyzing a cut-back of incentives for transmigration, two major problems arise. First,
in a model with a disaggregated agricultural sector the available data do not allow to
differentiate between production by official transmigrants, who receive direct support from
the government, and production by spontaneous migrants as well as shifting cultivators, who18
only take advantage of the infrastructure created by the government.
1
8 Second, the numerous
different subsidies granted to transmigrants cannot be reconciled with the data base used in
the analysis. To overcome these problems it is assumed that all three producer groups profit
equally from government support so that they can be treated together
1
9 and that the support
can be approximated by a production subsidy. In view of this simplification, the simulation
results should only be interpreted as rough indicators of the actual effects.
Three different policy experiments are considered. The first is a general elimination of
subsidies for agricultural production in the Outer Islands. The second experiment takes into
account that a complete abolition of the transmigraiion program may be unrealistic in view of
the population pressure prevailing in the Inner Islands. Here, only food crop production in the
Outer Islands is discouraged, because it has much lower economic potential than cash crop
production. In a final experiment, the cutback of incentives for food crop production is
combined with a realization of the estimated potential to increase productivity in cash crop
production. The latter is modeled as an increase of the efficiency parameter in the production
function for cash crops in the Outer Islands by 30 percent.
Table 4 presents the effects these policies have on some important macroeconomic and
agricultural variables as well as on the use of forest resources. Generally, the elimination of
subsidies for agricultural production in the Outer Islands results in small efficiency gains. If
the removal of subsidies is combined with productivity increases in cash crop production, the
increase in real GDP is somewhat higher.
A general cut-back of transmigration incentives (Simulation 8) leads to a substantial increase
in the volume of standing timber. Since agricultural profitability in the Outer Islands steeply
declines, much less land than in the base run is used in agriculture, i.e., there is a reallocation
of land from agriculture to forestry.
2
0 This raises forestry's annual output (see Equation 3) and
lowers the timber price. The price depression in forestry forces timber concessionaires to
extend the rotation period (see Section 3.1) and this, in turn is followed by higher harvests per
rotation. Since a more intensive harvesting may endanger the sustainability of forestry, the
1
8 Such a differentiation can be achieved if the agricultural sector is modeled as an aggregate.
1
9 An important question is whether the activities of the three producer groups are substitutable or
complementary. There are plausible explanations for both assumptions. Substitutability can be interpreted
in such a way that transmigrants who leave their sites because of lower subsidies attract spontaneous
migrants and shifting cultivators. Complementarity means that if some transmigration sites had not been
established, spontaneous migration and shifting cultivation in forested areas would also have been lower,
because both activities depend on the infrastructure created by the government. If one follows the latter
interpretation, there is some justification for taking all three producer groups together.
2
0 Since the majority of transmigration sites is established on logged-over stands and not in primary forests, it
is assumed here that areas which are nor used for transmigration remain in forestry, i.e., the overall supply
of forest land is held constant. If lower transmigration preserved primary forests from bein converted into
agricultural land, this would have to be modeled as a reduction in the overall supply of land.19
cut-back of transmigration incentives could be accompanied by an increase in the minimum
harvest age for trees.
Table 4 - Consequences of a Reformed Transmigration Policy for the Economy and the Use
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Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
Two major side effects of a general elimination of the support for transmigration are likely to
cause the Indonesian government to refrain from choosing this policy option. First,
agricultural production in Indonesia would decrease by 6.2 percent. Second, and more
important, agricultural employment in the Outer Islands would almost break down. While it is
assumed here that the labor market is flexible enough to achieve a reallocation of the released
labor to other sectors such as construction and services in the medium run, this may be a too
optimistic assumption in view of the low qualification of most transmigrants so that
significant unemployment cannot be excluded. If the government on this grounds regards
some transmigration as necessary and if it concentrates its support on the more profitable
growing of cash crops, the increase in the volume of standing timber is 30 percent lower,
while the release of agricultural labor is halved (Simulation 9). Agricultural production20
losses, however, remain at a significant level. These losses are kept to a minimum, if cash
crop production realizes its estimated productivity potential (Simulation 10).
4.4. International Measures
This section deals with the two basic options which industrialized countries have to affect the
level of tropical forest exploitation (see Section 2). First, an import ban of Indonesian timber
products is considered, the most restrictive among all possible trade policy measures. Second,
international transfer payments are investigated. The results of the simulations are presented
in Table 5.
Tabie 5 - Consequences of International Measures for the Economy and the Use of Forest







































































































Source: Own calculations based on the CGE model.
As it seems unrealistic that an import ban works perfectly, it is assumed in Simulation 11 that
Indonesia after the introduction of the ban is still able to sell 10 percent of its previous timber21
products exports to outsiders who do not obey the ban. Nevertheless, the decline in exports
leads to substantial output losses in wood processing and in forestry, via the strong forward
linkage to wood processing. The decrease in export demand for timber products is, however,
not fully transmitted to domestic production of the wood processing sector. The foregone
exports are partly substituted by an increase in domestic use, especially by the construction
sector. Altogether, the relatively high export orientation of the timber industry makes the ban
rather effective as concerns forestry activity. The use of land in forestry is reduced by 18.2
percent, while the rotation period and the harvested volume per hectare per rotation remain
constant. The effectiveness of the ban in slowing down the activity in the timber industry
imposes considerable costs on the Indonesian economy, as is indicated by a decline in real
GDP of nearly one percent.
The net effect of the ban on the use of tropical forest resources depends on how agricultural
conversion changes. This change is affected by two dominating economy-wide repercussions.
First, the income losses in the economy lead to a decreasing demand for domestically
produced goods. This effect is particularly relevant for rice and other food crops, which
nearly exclusively serve the domestic market, while it does hardly affect cash crops. Second,
the drop in exports causes a real depreciation, which favors cash crops and hurts food crops.
On balance, there is a reallocation of land from forestry to agriculture, especially to cash
crops, i.e., agricultural conversion increases compared to the reference situation. This effect
nearly matches the primary effect on land use in forestry so that the volume of standing
timber only increases by an insignificant amount. This outcome shows that a relatively high
share of exported timber products is a necessary but no sufficient condition for an import ban
to be ecologically effective if, like in Indonesia, exports of forestry products can partly be
substituted by domestic uses and agricultural conversion is encouraged as a result of lower
profitability in forestry.
With respect to compensation payments for the conservation of tropical forests, we
presuppose that tropical and non-tropical countries have negotiated an environmental
agreement. Then, three basic questions arise for the individual tropical country: how can it
reach the specified ecological target; how much side payments will it receive for the
protection of its forests; and how is it going to spend the money. Consequently, one has to
analyze a combination of an external transfer and a complementary national forestry policy
measure.
In Simulation 14, it is assumed that the Indonesian government directly sets aside tropical
forest areas and that the amount of compensation payments injected into the economy - 3.2
billion US dollar - just matches the economic losses resulting from the establishment of a22
national park.
2
1 Since the theoretical reference point for transfer payments is given by the
difference between economic losses and local ecological benefits of forest conservation, this
amount constitutes an upper bound. Furthermore, the transfer is assumed to be provided




The effects of establishing a national park have already been discussed in Section 4.1.
Simulation 12 shows how the external transfer qualifies these results. As the money is
invested and thus adds to the productive capacity of the economy, the increase in demand
exerts only moderate pressure on domestic prices. Nevertheless, the resulting small
appreciation and the rise in income are sufficient to induce a reallocation of land from cash
crops to food crops and forestry, which because of the export ban is almost a non-traded
sector. On balance, agricultural conversion increases. Hence, the effects of the compensation
payment somewhat dampen the effectiveness of the set-aside, but a substantial ecological gain
of 492 million m
3 biomass at zero economic costs remains (see Simulation 14).
If the same amount of money is spent for consumption instead of investment (Simulation 13),
a different picture emerges. In this case, the increase in demand forces up domestic goods
prices in relation to foreign goods prices as is indicated by a significant real appreciation of
the Indonesian Rupiah. The price increase causes a decline in real investment so that
economic growth is slightly lowered compared to the base run. This result illustrates that a
transfer can only compensate for the losses of forest conservation, if the money is actually
invested.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has provided an empirical general equilibrium assessment of policies to reduce
tropical deforestation in Indonesia. Four different categories of policy measures are
distinguished in the analysis: forestry policies which aim at correcting market failure at the
national level; the removal of distortions which may have a positive indirect impact on
tropical forests; a cut-back of the transmigration program which aims at reducing the
agricultural conversion of forest areas; and international measures which try to internalize the
global external costs of tropical deforestation.
It has been shown that a prespecified reduction in the use of forest resources can be reached
by each of the forestry policies analyzed: More secure concession; a higher minimum harvest
age of trees; the establishment of national parks; a Pigou-tax on land in the Outer Islands.
2
1 Here we neglect the principal-agent problem which may arise, i.e., the possibility that Indonesia does not
fulfill its ecological obligations after having received the transfer. Amelung (1991) suggests that a payment
in instalments can reduce this problem.
2
2 Alternatively, one may formulate more specific conditions, e.g., that the transfers have to be used to
finance measures which enhance agricultural productivity outside tropical forest areas.23
From an ecological point of view, a combination of more secure property rights and a higher
minimum harvesting age is the preferable option. This policy mix causes the rotation period
to rise to the length which is recommended by forestry experts and at the same time reduces
the harvesting intensity which is currently very high in international comparison. All forestry
policies lead to moderate short to medium run losses in aggregate output.
The trade-off between economic and ecological objectives can be overcome, if the
government corrects for policy failures. Substantial ecological gains arise from a
liberalization of the forestry industry. As this policy change leads to a significant shortening
of the rotation period, it should be combined with more secure property rights and a higher
minimum harvest age. A removal of the fertilizer and pesticide subsidy also reduces the use
of forest resources but the effect is small, partly because low-input cultivation is predominant
in the Outer Islands. Contrary to the two specific measures, a general trade liberalization has
negative ecological side effects, because it causes a reallocation of land from forestry and
food crops to cash crops so that on balance agricultural conversion increases.
An elimination of incentives for transmigration to the Outer Islands is another possibility to
protect tropical forests without suffering short and medium run output losses. A general cut-
back of transmigration promises high ecological gains, but two consequences have to be
considered: First, agricultural employment in the Outer Islands steeply declines so that a
substantial reallocation of labor has to be achieved in order to avoid unemployment. Second,
aggregate agricultural production decreases. If the government regards some transmigration
as necessary, a compromise might be to concentrate the support on cash crop production
which has much higher economic potential than food crop production. Under this option, the
conservation of biomass is 30 percent lower but the release of agricultural labor is halved.
Losses in agricultural production can be kept to a minimum, if the potential for increasing
productivity in cash crop production on the Outer Islands is realized.
An import ban for Indonesian timber products does not protect the tropical forests, although a
significant share of the timber products is exported. This is due to the fact that exports are
partly substituted by domestic uses of wood and agricultural conversion increases as a result
of lower profitability in forestry. Apart from being ecologically ineffective a ban would place
considerable costs on the Indonesian economy. International compensation payments can be a
powerful tool to compensate for the economic losses of forest conservation, if the money is
used for investment in order to create new employment opportunities. A crucial question is,
however, how it can be ensured that Indonesia fulfills its ecological obligations after having
received the transfer. Answering this question goes beyond the scope of the paper because it
requires a different analytical framework.24
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